The End of Empathy

The End of Empathy develops a theoretical framework capable of explaining both the rise of white Protestant social concern in the latter part of the nineteenth century and its sudden demise at the end of the twentieth. The theory proceeds from the premise that religious conviction, by itself, is rarely sufficient to motivate empathetic political behavior. When believers do act empathetically - for example, by championing reforms that transfer resources or political influence to less privileged groups within society - it is typically because strong religious institutions have compelled them to do so. For much of American history, mainline Protestant church membership functioned as an important marker of social status - one that few upwardly mobile citizens could afford to go without. The socioeconomic significance of membership, in turn, endowed Protestant leaders with considerable authority over the beliefs and actions of their congregations. At key junctures in U.S. history - the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the civil rights movement - the nation's informal Protestant establishment used this authority to mobilize rank-and-file churchgoers on behalf of government programs that increased economic opportunity and promoted civic inclusion. When this pattern of religious authority collapsed in the late 1960s - thanks to a confluence of trends in the labor market, higher education, and residential mobility - it produced a large population of white suburbanites who had little reason to seek out mainline Protestant churches or heed their advice on the burning social questions of the day. The churches that flourished in the new age of personal autonomy were those that preached against attempts by government to promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and political authority--